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A “true” American takes pride in the democratic processes that grant power to the 
people, right? Some literature has shown that “power to the people” is actually quite far 
from being uniformly endorsed by the American people, largely because of the inherent 
conflict and disagreement that comes with it (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). So 
are people more positive toward democratic processes when they perceive consensus 
among citizens? I utilize survey data from a representative sample of the United States in 
order to show that perceptions of consensus are positively related to support for the 
political power of the American people, but only insofar as this power is filtered through 
elected representatives. As prior research has suggested, perceptions of consensus are 
largely a function of national identity (Theiss-Morse, 2009), which has both direct and 
indirect influences on attitudes regarding representative democracy. Generalized trust 
shows substantial independent relationships with both perceptions of consensus and 
attitudes for the political power of the public. Importantly, national identity, perceived 
consensus, and generalized trust exhibit different relationships with support for more 
direct involvement of the public in decision-making. All are related to increases in having 
faith in the public during elections, but national identity is unrelated to support for more 
direct involvement, and both trust and perceived consensus are negatively related to 
support for more direct involvement. Support for indirect democratic processes has the 
expected relationships with national identity and perceptions of consensus, but things are 









   
The Jeffersonian ideal of direct democracy – it’s in the air and in the water. And it 
is not an exclusively American ideal. People from democracies across the world hold 
most precious the will of the public over that of any elite or politician, and will gladly 
stand and march to the tune of John Lennon’s “Power to the People” if the will of the 
public is undermined. Obviously, this is only true in theory. While Americans do value 
the idea of political power being held primarily by the public, they are also by and large 
resistant to the idea of actually becoming involved in politics and have little (if any) 
positive regard for a direct democratic political system. When asked in detail about their 
preferences for how government should work, Americans prefer a sort of “stealth 
democracy” to the direct democracy that many theorists and even practitioners typically 
think of as the American ideal (see Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). In a “stealth 
democracy,” selfless public representatives make decisions on behalf of constituents with 
public input only in the rare circumstance that the public has a clear opinion on the 
issues. When there is “too much” public input, such as that inherent in the processes 
proposed by many deliberative theorists (e.g., Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Dahl, 1970), 
people generally shirk at the conflict and disagreement that it usually comes with. 
Americans’ ideals of how government should work are thus more in line with the 
representative democracy talked about by Madison than the direct democracy 
championed by Jefferson. But this does not mean that people never have faith in 
democratic processes, or in the public as a whole. There is a sizable amount of variation 
in attitudes regarding the extent to which political decisions should be made 
“democratically” (e.g., Hibbing, Theiss-Morse, & Whitaker, 2008). So when and why do 
people actually put faith in democratic procedures?  
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Indeed, this is quite a broad and daunting question to tackle in a research paper. 
Other research has shed light on this issue from various perspectives. In this paper, I 
tackle this question from the psychological perspective of the Social Identity Approach 
(e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985), which has been applied to the concept of 
national identity in past literature (e.g., Huddy, 2001; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Theiss-
Morse, 2009). Specifically, I propose that national identity will be positively related to 
faith in the American people’s decisions making within our representative system, but 
will be negatively related to support for more direct democratic processes, as direct 
democracy is a deviation from the representative American system. This follows from 
prior research that has suggested that individuals high in national identity are also more 
likely to engage in “ideal behaviors” of the national group, such as participating in 
politics (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). If representative democracy is an American ideal, then 
we should expect those who strongly identify with being American to value democratic 
processes that reflect indirect democracy more than those who only weakly identify with 
being American, and vice versa with regard to more direct involvement of the people. 
Further, one of the proposed reasons for why Americans don’t put faith in 
decision-making by the people is that they are turned off by the amount of conflict and 
disagreement that is inherent in these processes (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). 
Indeed, research has suggested that the social conflict of democratic processes is a 
significant deterrent to political involvement (McClurg, 2006; Mutz, 2006; Ulbig & 
Funk, 1999), even at the biological level (e.g., French et al., 2011; Neiman et al., 2013). It 
is also possible that greater perceived consensus among the public is associated with 
perceptions that more people agree with one’s own beliefs. Along these lines, I suggest 
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that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity among the American people will be 
positively related to faith in the American people’s decisions making, but only insofar as 
this decision-making stays in line with the American representative system of 
government. Simply put, if people perceive the American public to be on the same page 
with regards to their attitudes and values, then they will perceive less of a chance for 
conflict and disagreement when the public is put in charge of decision-making, so long as 
that decision-making is within the realm of a representative system.  
Interestingly, some work has shown that individuals high in American national 
identity are more likely to perceive consensus and homogeneity among the American 
public than those low in American national identity (Theiss-Morse, 2009). I therefore 
propose that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity will be positively related to faith 
in the American people’s decision making within a representative system, and that 
national identity will display a positive relationship with perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity as well as a direct positive relationship with faith in the American people’s 
decision making. 
This paper is not intended to provide a full explanation for why people do or do 
not support democratic processes. Rather, I utilize data with psychological variables 
related to national identity and perceptions of the American people in order to see how 
these variables are related to attitudes regarding democracy. The results I present are, 
rather, proposed as an addition to the larger picture of how we might understand public 
support for democratic procedures. I propose national identity and the subsequent 
perceptions of consensus and homogeneity among a populace as important factors in 
understanding when people put faith in a democracy and the people within it.  
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Democracy, Stress, and Conflict 
 The attitudes of Americans regarding how democracy should work cannot be 
summed up concisely in any meaningful way except to say that there is quite a bit of 
variation. Utilizing data from the 2006 Congressional Elections Study (CES), Hibbing, 
Theiss-Morse, and Whitaker show that Americans are surprisingly divided on key issues 
regarding how the government should be run. When asked, “would you prefer that 
members of Congress: a) stand up for their principles, or b) compromise with opponents 
in order to get something done,” respondents were roughly divided 50/50 (2008, p. 155-
156). The same goes for the question, “which of the following do you think is the better 
explanation for why Congress sometimes has difficulty arriving at decisions? a) 
American people have different ideas, or b) American people agree but Congress like to 
argue.” Further, only 55% of respondents chose “the American people” over “policy 
experts or members of Congress” as the group that would make decisions that would best 
solve the country’s problems.  
One explanation for this variation is based on the idea that democratic politics 
comes with a substantial degree of conflict between people and between points of view, 
and this simply turns some people off. Indeed, civic participation has been found to be 
lower in heterogeneous communities, where there is, theoretically, greater diversity in 
views, than in homogenous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Campbell, 2004; 
Costa & Kahn, 2003; see Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005). However, whether this is a 
function of individual differences in conflict-avoidance or differences in the amount of 
conflict in politics that people perceive remains unclear. Both factors likely play vital 
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roles and are likely interrelated. Some work has focused on the former explanation, but 
little has addressed the latter. 
 Individual differences in conflict-avoidance have been associated with lower 
political involvement (e.g., Ulbig & Funk, 1999). Even at the level of human biology, 
those with higher baseline levels of the hormone, cortisol, which has been strongly 
related to stress, are shown to be more likely to become involved in politics than those 
with lower baseline levels of cortisol (e.g., French et al., 2011). On the other hand, some 
work supports a more context-dependent explanation, suggesting that exposure to 
political disagreement deflates motivations to participate in politics (e.g., McClurg, 2006; 
Mutz, 2006; but see Jang, 2009 on how this is not necessarily always the case). So there 
is evidence that both individual differences in reactivity to conflict and social context 
play important roles in attitudes related to democracy, but what remains to be studied is 
whether individual differences in perceptions of social conflict are also playing a role. If 
“my America” consists of a homogenous public, is democracy as stressful as for someone 
whose America is diverse?  
Some work has suggested that high levels of national identity can yield 
perceptions of homogeneity in a country (Theiss-Morse, 2009). If this is the case, then 
perhaps national identity can indirectly appease cynicism toward democratic procedures 
via having a positive impact on perceptions of consensus and homogeneity among the 
public. However, I also suggest that national identity will have a direct effect on attitudes 
regarding democratic procedures that is not dependent on perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity. The theory on which this proposed direct relationship is built is essential, 
because it is upon this literature that I propose that the relationship between perceptions 
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of consensus and homogeneity with attitudes toward democratic procedures is limited. 
Perceptions of consensus and homogeneity, which are largely a function of national 
identity, are only positively related to support for the decision-making power of the 
public insofar as that decision-making happens within the realm of the agreed-upon 
system (in the case of the United States, a representative democracy). Once the power of 
the public extends beyond that of the prescribed norm within society (i.e., toward a more 
direct democracy), national identity, and thus perceptions of consensus and homogeneity, 
should display a negative effect on support for power residing with the people. This 
hypothesis requires an examination of literature on social identity and group norms. 
National Identity and Adherence to Group Norms 
Social Identity and Politics 
The Social Identity Approach in psychology encompasses two related theories: 
Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Categorization Theory 
(e.g., Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Under this framework of understanding human 
behavior, an individual’s sense of worth is derived from his or her perceived group’s 
status, and as such, the self becomes inextricably linked to the group – people feel when 
their group wins and when their group loses. Citrin and colleagues were among the first 
to empirically investigate the existence of an “American identity,” and found that 
people’s subjective definitions of what is “American” vary substantially between 
individuals (e.g., Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2000; also see 
Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Building more directly from the Social Identity 
Approach, Huddy (2001) provides a thorough outline of how the study of social identity 
may be applied to the study of political behavior. In doing so, she highlights that the 
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strength of identification individuals feel toward a group may vary, and that certain group 
identities may be more stable and long-lasting than others. These variations in the 
strength and stability of certain identities are especially relevant to political identities, 
which are often influenced by history and context. As such, the study of political identity 
requires examination of individual differences. Other work has shown that there is indeed 
a measurable “national identity” that individuals feel, and that this identity has significant 
implications for political behavior (e.g., Huddy & Khatib, 2007).   
National Identity and Democratic Norms 
According to the Social Identity Approach, individuals who identify strongly with 
a group are also likely to abide by that group’s norms, such that even behaviors that 
would benefit the individual are left to the wayside if they are not endorsed by the group 
as “normal” (e.g., Turner et al., 1987; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). The norms of a 
group are functional in the sense that they enforce interdependence among individuals 
(e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Stevens & Fiske, 1995; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 
1991; Fiske & Von Hendy, 1992; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 1996). 
Similarly, behaviors that may not even necessarily be rational are endorsed by strong 
identifiers if the group also endorses those behaviors (e.g., Terry, Hogg, & Duck, 1999; 
Wellen, Hogg, & Terry, 1998).  
 Huddy and Khatib (2007) build off of this literature to show that individual 
differences in strength of national identity are actually related to differences in levels of 
political involvement. It has been shown in some research that “prescriptive” norms that 
suggest how members of a group ought to behave are more effective and emotionally 
rewarding than “descriptive” norms that simply tell how members of a group do behave 
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(Christensen et al., 2004). Huddy and Khatib demonstrate that this holds for political 
involvement broadly as well, and demonstrate using multiple samples that strong national 
identity is positively related to increased political involvement (2007). Thus, there is 
evidence that identification with the national group comes with, just as with any other 
group, positive appraisals of the prescribed norms and ideals of that group. By this logic, 
it would make sense for individuals who strongly identify with a country where 
representative democracy is the “prescribed group norm” to value this ideal to a greater 
extent than individuals who only weakly identify with that country. This is precisely what 
I expect to find in the United States.  
National Identity and Perceptions of the American People 
 Indirect democracy can be seen as a norm in itself, but it can also be seen as a 
reflection of people’s attitudes toward the American public as a whole. Some work 
suggests that individual differences in identification with the national group are essential 
to Americans’ attitudes toward members of the American populace. National identity has 
a positive relationship with how people view the United States in general, but high levels 
of national identity also come with a tendency to “marginalize” fellow citizens who are 
not seen as typical of the “average” American (Theiss-Morse, 2009). Thus, strong 
feelings of national identity come with a cost to our democracy in which any citizen, 
regardless of their prototypical qualities, is supposed to be equally qualified to receive the 
benefits associated with being a citizen. 
The reason that individuals high in national identity set strict boundaries on being 
a “true” American and marginalize less prototypical citizens is essentially that the 
strength of the group as a close-knit, coherent network of individuals is more important to 
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high identifiers than to low identifiers. The Social Identity Approach suggests that group 
identification is closely linked to psychological motivations like maintenance and 
improvement of self-esteem (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971; but see Abrams & Hogg, 1988 for 
review of how self-esteem is related to social identity), and even from an evolutionary 
perspective, as Fiske concisely explains, “over human history, being banished from the 
group has amounted to a death sentence” (2000, p. 305). Group membership also comes 
with increased perceptions of cohesion in the world; the world becomes easier to 
understand under the guidelines of societal or group-level norms. Along these lines, 
humans turn to the in-group as a source of protection from both physical threat and 
psychological uncertainty (see Fiske, 2000). For individuals identifying strongly with the 
in-group, there is an inherent motivation to see the group as highly entitative, cohesive, 
and even homogenous. Cohesion allows for a stronger in-group with more a more clearly 
understandable structure.   
Theiss-Morse provides evidence that people high in national identity are indeed 
more likely than those low in national identity to perceive Americans as sharing the same 
values and as agreeing on the major political issues of the day (2009, p. 84-85). 
Essentially, people who identify strongly with being American are more likely to 
perceive the American populace as cohesive, tight-knit, and homogenous with regard to 
values and attitudes. I suggest that these perceptions have a positive impact on how 
individuals feel about political power lying in the hands of the American public, but only 
when this power is filtered through the representative system that serves as the “group 
norm” for the United States. 
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Theory and Hypotheses: National Identity, Consensus, and Direct Democracy 
 It is easy for many citizens to frown upon democratic processes due to the conflict 
and subsequent stress that is inherent in them. In a democratic nation, this is not only 
concerning but also somewhat paradoxical, as it is the democratic nature of a government 
that ultimately leads to preferences for less democratic processes. However, as research 
has shown, there is actually a substantial degree of variation in preferences for 
democratic processes (e.g., Hibbing, Theiss-Morse, & Whitaker, 2008).  I suggest that 
national identity leads to perceiving higher levels of consensus and homogeneity among 
the public, which will lead to greater confidence in the political power of the people 
within a representative system, but to less confidence in that power when regarding more 
direct power by the people.  
I first seek to replicate findings that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity are 
largely influenced by national identity (Theiss-Morse, 2009). As such, my first 
hypothesis is: 
1. Strength of American national identity will be significantly positively related to 
perceptions of consensus and homogeneity among the American people.  
I next seek to demonstrate that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity are related 
to attitudes toward the American public’s political power, and that national identity plays 
not only an indirect role through these perceptions, but also a direct role due to its 
significance in adherence to group norms. However, I suggest that the relationships 
between perceptions of consensus and homogeneity and attitudes toward democratic 
procedures will be reversed between attitudes toward the role of the public in the current 
(representative) system and attitudes toward the public in a more direct democratic 
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system. As such, I layout separate hypotheses for attitudes regarding indirect democratic 
processes and those regarding direct processes. These hypotheses are:  
2. Perceptions of consensus and homogeneity with regard to the values and attitudes 
of the American public will be significantly positively related to confidence in the 
American public’s decision-making during elections.  
3. Besides the indirect relationship through perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity, strength of American national identity will have a significant, 
positive, direct effect on confidence in the American public’s decision-making 
during elections.  
4. Perceptions of consensus and homogeneity with regard to the values and attitudes 
of the American public will be significantly negatively related to support for more 
direct involvement of the public in political decision-making.  
5. Besides the indirect relationship through perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity, strength of American national identity will have a significant, 
negative, direct effect on support for more direct involvement of the public in 
political decision-making.  
Data and Measures 
The data used for this paper are the same data used by Theiss-Morse (2009), 
which was collected via the Perceptions of the American People project funded by the 
National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0111887). The survey was administered by the 
Ohio State University’s Center for Survey Research, and data were collected through 
1,254 interviews between May 29, 2002 and July 21, 2002. Households in the 48 
contiguous states and the District of Columbia were randomly selected via random-digit 
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dialing, and an English-speaking respondent within the household was randomly chosen 
using the “last birthday” selection technique (Lavrakas, 1993). Only U.S. citizens were 
included in the sample (see Theiss-Morse, 2009 for additional details regarding the 
survey data).  
Measures 
 Confidence in the American people during elections: The first variable used to 
address support for democratic processes is a question regarding how much confidence 
people have in the American people when it comes to being involved in political 
decision-making during elections. I use this variable as a measure of people’s support for 
the political power of the public within the current, representative system of the United 
States. The question was worded, “How much trust and confidence do you have in the 
wisdom of the American people when it comes to making choices on Election Day?” and 
response options ranged from 1, meaning none, to 4, meaning a great deal (M = 2.74, 
S.D. = 0.79). The item distribution exhibited sufficient normality and was slightly but not 
substantially negatively skewed (skewness = -.363).  
 Support for more direct involvement of the American people: The second 
variable I use to address support for democratic processes is a question that taps into 
support for the American public having more say in political decision-making. It is one 
thing to have confidence in the ability of the American people to make decisions under 
the status quo, in which the will of the people is filtered through public representatives 
via elections, but it is quite different to support a deviation from, as I have described 
above, the group norm of representative democracy. The question measured respondents’ 
agreement (from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree) with the statement: “If the 
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American people decided political issues directly instead of relying on politicians, the 
country would be a lot better off” (M = 2.90, S.D. = 1.12).  
 Perceived consensus: Perceptions of consensus among the American people can 
be thought of as the degree to which people see the public as capable of agreeing on 
issues related to politics. This taps directly into the idea that what people dislike about 
democratic processes is the stress and conflict that comes out of people trying to 
compromise who have diverging issues stances. Perceptions of consensus were measured 
via an item worded: “On the major issues of the day, do Americans agree almost all of 
the time, agree sometimes, or agree almost none of the time?” This item was reverse-
coded so that 1 means agree none of the time and 3 means agree almost all of the time (M 
= 1.95, S.D. = 0.44).  
 Perceived homogeneity: Perceptions of homogeneity are distinct from 
perceptions of consensus because rather than gauging the ability of the public to agree on 
particular issues, homogeneity refers to the degree to which the public consists of 
individuals holding the same values and beliefs. While consensus refers to how much 
agreement there would be if the public were given the opportunity to make a decision at a 
particular time, homogeneity refers more to levels of similarity between Americans on a 
more static level. The item used to measure perceptions of homogeneity was agreement 
(from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree) with the statement: “Americans are 
similar to each other, sharing the same values and outlooks” (M = 3.10, S.D. = 1.08).  
 Personal similarity and agreement: It is possible, and in fact quite obvious, that 
the amount of power people prefer to be in the hands of the public might depend on how 
much they perceive the public as sharing their own views. When one thinks they are on 
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the same page as everyone else, of course they will support “power to the people.” In 
order to test for the possibility that perceptions of consensus are not simply acting as 
proxies for personal similarity, I include two variables in my models that gauge how 
similar respondents feel personally to the American public as a whole. The first item 
resembles a personal-level version of perceptions of consensus, and is worded: “On the 
important issues, I find I often agree with the American people” (ranging from 1, strongly 
disagree, to 5, strongly agree) (M = 3.62, S.D. = 0.92). The second item resembles a 
personal-level version of perceptions of homogeneity, and is worded: “In many respects, 
I am different from most Americans” (ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly 
agree – reverse-coded so that higher values mean disagreement) (M = 3.09, S.D. = 1.12). 
Interactions between each of these variables and each of the consensus and homogeneity 
variables are also included in the models to test for the possibility that the relationship 
between consensus/homogeneity and attitudes toward democratic processes depends on 
how similar individuals feel to the public.  
American national identity: A measure of identification with America was 
constructed using a set of 6 items included in the survey that addressed feelings toward 
fellow Americans as well as how respondents perceive themselves in relation to the 
American national group, thus capturing both the cognitive and affective elements of 
social identity (see Theiss-Morse, 2009). The scale demonstrated sufficient reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .648). Each of these items was transformed to range from 0 to 1, and 
then a variable was created using the mean of these items, where higher values indicate 
stronger identification (M = 0.72, S.D. = 0.12). The scale is slightly negatively skewed 
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but not enough to warrant transformation (skewness = -.660) (see Appendix A for exact 
items).  
 Uncritical Patriotism and Nationalism: Prior literature has shown that it is very 
important to distinguish national identity from other forms of attachment to one’s 
country. Huddy and Khatib (2007) showed convincingly that national identity, as 
conceptualized under a social identity framework, is distinct from symbolic, constructive, 
and uncritical patriotism, as well as nationalism.  While national identity is an internal, 
psychological belonging to the national group, traditional measures of patriotism are 
often conflated with other aspects of political behavior like ideology or political 
involvement. Other research suggests that nationalism and patriotism are actually 
extensions of specific aspects of national identity (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1997; Schatz & Staub, 
1997; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Blank & Schmidt, 2003). As such, I include items 
in my models that account for alternative constructs. Unfortunately, the data do not 
contain items relating to symbolic or constructive patriotism, so I only include items 
addressing uncritical patriotism and nationalism.  
Two items address uncritical patriotism: “Americans should support the U.S. even 
if it is in the wrong” (M = 2.83, S.D. = 1.14), and “There are some things about the U.S. 
today that make me feel ashamed of the U.S.” (M = 2.56, S.D. = 1.15) (both ranging from 
1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree). These items demonstrated poor reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .290), and so are included separately in each model. Four items were 
used to gauge feelings of nationalism, which is essentially pride in one’s country relative 
to other countries. High levels of nationalism would infer, for example, the belief that the 
United States is the best country in the world (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Each of 
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these items was measured on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and 
was coded so that higher values indicate higher levels of nationalism. A scale was created 
as the mean of the 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .617; see Appendix A for exact items).  
 Group Identification in general: Strength of identification with various 
demographic groups the respondents belonged to was measured to control for the 
possibility that some people are just strong “identifiers” in general. That is, some people 
are likely to report identifying strongly with most, if not all, groups that they perceive 
themselves as belonging to. Since I am interested only in the extent to which people 
display national identity, I control for identification with other groups so as to isolate the 
part of national identity in each model that is specific to individuals’ feelings to the 
United States. This variable was constructed by calculating the mean of 6 items 
measuring identification with the respondent’s racial or ethnic group, members of the 
same sex, people who do the same work, people with the same religious beliefs, people 
from the same region of the country, and people from the same state. Each was measured 
on a 7-point scale from “not a part of this group” to “very strongly part of this group” and 
held together as one factor yielding high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .810) (M = 5.48, 
S.D. = 1.15).  
 Generalized Trust: A measure of generalized trust was included to account for 
the fact that some people might simply be more trusting of others, which might explain 
differences in strength of national identity as well as levels of support for direct 
democratic processes. Indeed, in-group associations have been associated with trust (e.g., 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; but see Fiske, 2000), and it seems likely that generalized trust in 
others would follow the same patterns as perceptions of consensus and homogeneity. 
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Two dichotomous variables were used: “Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got the chance, or do you think they would try to be fair?” and 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or would you say 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The mean of these variables was 
taken yielding a scale from 0 (not trusting) to 1 (trusting) (M = 0.57, S.D. = .42), and 
showed sufficient reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .638).  
Ideology: Ideology was evaluated in the survey via two questions – one asking 
whether respondents identified as liberal, moderate, or conservative, and then a follow-up 
question that asked respondents that picked liberal or conservative how strongly they 
identified with that ideology on a 3-point scale. A single ideology measure was calculated 
from these items by transforming the first variable into a -1 to 1 scale, and then 
multiplying that variable times the ideological strength variable to obtain a 7-point 
ideological scale from “strongly liberal” to “strongly conservative” (M = 0.31, S.D. = 
1.56). This variable is included in all primary analyses as a continuous variable so as to 
maximize the information obtained from each analysis. As such, it is important to note 
that relationships are the result of comparing “more conservative” individuals to “more 
liberal” individuals, as opposed to comparing self-identified conservatives to self-
identified liberals (although, the data are not substantially skewed; skewness = -.222).  
Political Knowledge: Political knowledge was measured using responses to four 
questions: three regarding the current (at the time) political system and one representing 
the American political system in general. The items were: “What job or political office 
does Dick Cheney now hold?” (70 percent correct); “What job or political office does 
Tony Blair now hold?” (45 percent correct); “Who has the final responsibility to decide if 
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a law is constitutional or not? Is it the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court?” (53 
percent correct); and, “Which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of 
Representatives?” (51 percent correct). These items were coded so that 1 means correct, 
and then a scale was created from the mean of the 4 items (M = 0.77, S.D. = 0.24).  
 The rest of the variables included in the models are standard control variables and 
were coded according to common standards. Race was coded so that 0 meant “White,” 1 
meant “Black” (or “African American”), and 2 meant “Other,” and religious affiliation 
was dummy coded so that all Christian denominations were coded as 1, and all others 0.  
Results 
Using OLS regression, I ran two sets of models testing my hypotheses. First, I 
will explain my results as they pertain to trust and confidence in the American people on 
Election Day. These models shed light on how national identity and perceptions of 
consensus and homogeneity are related to confidence in the American people to carry out 
democratic processes within the current system of indirect democracy. Then, I show what 
happens when I turn to the dependent variable of support for more direct involvement of 
the people in political decision-making. These models, I suggest, show what relationships 
exist when people are asked if they want to deviate from the status quo and empower the 
public beyond the current system. Importantly, these two dependent variables are 
uncorrelated with one another (r = -.008, p = .795), supporting the idea that, although 
these items seem very related to one another at face value, they tap into quite different 
constructs. While this does not demonstrate that the constructs I hypothesize are indeed 
the two that underlay these items, it does bolster the expectation that my main 
independent variables would have such differing effects on the two.   
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Trust and Confidence in the American People on Election Day 
Before we include measures of national attachment in the models, it is evident 
that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity among the American people are both 
positively related to trust and confidence in the American people on Election Day, thus 
supporting my second hypothesis (H2). Perceived consensus has a significant main effect 
on trust and confidence (B = .280, Std. Error = .081, t = 3.458, p = .001), and perceived 
homogeneity has an indirect effect through an interaction with personal similarity to the 
American people. The model as a whole does not explain much of the variation in trust 
and confidence in the American people (Adj. R2 =  .071, F = 3.331, p < .001), but 
nonetheless the theory holds that perceptions of consensus and homogeneity will exhibit 
a positive relationship. Table 1 shows these results.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The main effect of perceived homogeneity is non-significant (B = .051, Std. Error 
= .033, t = 1.567, p = .118), but the interaction between perceived homogeneity and how 
similar one perceives themselves to be to the American people is significant and negative 
(B = -.055, Std. Error = .025, t = -2.189, p = .029), meaning that the relationship between 
perceived homogeneity and trust and confidence in the American people on Election Day 
is significantly more positive among individuals who consider themselves more different 
from the American people. When I re-center the personal similarity variable at 1 standard 
deviation below the mean (to represent people who are generally on the lower end of 
personal similarity), there is a significant positive relationship between perceived 
homogeneity and trust and confidence in the American people on Election Day (B = .113, 
Std. Error = .041, t = 2.720, p = .007). This means that among people who perceive 
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themselves to be relatively different from the American people, there is a positive 
relationship between perceptions of homogeneity and trust and confidence in the 
American people, but as can be seen in Figure 1, those who feel average or greater than 
average levels of personal similarity have stable levels of trust and confidence regardless 
of perceived homogeneity.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
So, perceptions of consensus and homogeneity seem to have the expected effects 
with regard to this dependent variable, but are they emanating from national identity as 
hypothesized in my first hypothesis (H1)? OLS regression models suggest that 
perceptions of both consensus and homogeneity are, as shown by Theiss-Morse (2009), 
significantly positively related to national identity. Perceptions of consensus are 
significantly predicted by national identity (B = .776, Std. Error = .207, t = 3.752, p < 
.001), generalized trust (B = .147, Std. Error = .047, t = 3.120, p = .002), and income (B = 
-.031, Std. Error = .016, t = -1.984, p = .048). Although a substantial amount of variance 
remains unexplained (Adj. R2 = .073, F = 2.866, p < .001), it is still clear that perceptions 
of consensus are positively influenced by national identity, with generalized trust also 
accounting for a sizeable portion of variance. These results can be seen in Table 2.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 shows the model predicting perceptions of homogeneity. It is clear that 
national identity is a very significant predictor or perceptions of homogeneity here too (B 
= 1.859, Std. Error = .494, t = 3.764, p < .001), thus further replicating what was shown 
by Theiss-Morse (2009) and supporting H1. Other predictors include uncritical patriotism 
(supporting the U.S. even when it is wrong) (B = .141, Std. Error = .041, t = 3.437, p = 
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.001), generalized trust (B = .311, Std. Error = .113, t = 2.755, p = .006), and the 
interaction between ideology and uncritical patriotism (supporting the U.S. even when it 
is wrong) is marginal (B = .072, Std. Error = .041, t = 1.782, p = .075).  
[Table 3 about here] 
When we include all potential independent variables, including consensus and 
homogeneity variables as well as national identity variables, in a model predicting trust 
and confidence in the American people on Election Day, we can see that the overall 
results generally still hold (Adj. R2 = .137, F = 4.311, p < .001). National identity shows a 
significant independent relationship with trust and confidence in the American people 
outside of the influence of perceived consensus and homogeneity (B = 1.866, Std. Error = 
.390, t = 4.784, p < .001). This suggests that the effects of national identity on trust and 
confidence in the American people on Election Day are not merely through subsequent 
perceptions of consensus and homogeneity. Rather, in support of my third hypothesis 
(H3), national identity exhibits an independent effect. 
Perceived consensus also shows a significant main effect (B = .203, Std. Error = 
.083, t = 2.461, p = .014), providing further support for my H2. The model suggests, then, 
that seeing the American populace as capable of coming to an agreement on issues is 
positively related to having trust in confidence in them on Election Day. Also, 
generalized trust maintains its positive relationship with trust and confidence. These 
results can be seen in Table 4.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
Perceived homogeneity is marginally related to trust and confidence in the 
American people on Election Day via its interaction with personal agreement (B = .055, 
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Std. Error = .032, t = 1.723, p = .086). Similarly to what was found in Table 1 regarding 
just consensus and homogeneity variables as predictors, we can see that perceptions of 
the public as holding similar values and outlooks plays a more positive role in influencing 
trust and confidence in the public on Election Day when people perceive themselves as 
being on the same page as everyone else. However, in this case, the interaction is with 
personal agreement, or the extent to which respondents believe they agree with the public 
on issues, rather than personal similarity, or the extent to which respondents feel similar 
to the broader public. As can be seen in Figure 2, those who perceive themselves as 
agreeing with the public more display a more positive relationship between perceived 
homogeneity and trust and confidence in the public on Election Day.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Support for More Direct Involvement of the People  
 Turning to my other main dependent variable, support for more direct 
involvement of the public in political decision-making, results become quite different. An 
OLS regression utilizing perceived consensus and homogeneity variables but leaving out 
national identity variables shows that perceptions of homogeneity are unrelated to 
support for more direct involvement, and perceptions of consensus are significantly 
negatively related (B = -.336, Std. Error = .120, t = -2.807, p = .005), providing partial 
support for my fourth hypothesis (H4). The only other marginally significant prediction 
comes from ideology, and suggests that increased conservatism is marginally associated 
with decreased support for more direct involvement of the people (B = -.056, Std. Error = 
.032, t = -1.753, p = .080). Thus, overall, a very small amount of variance is explained by 
the model (Adj. R2 = .027, F = 1.828, p = .017). Nonetheless, the model suggests that 
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perceptions of homogeneity don’t matter for support for more direct involvement of the 
people, and perceptions of consensus are associated with lower levels of support for more 
direct involvement of the people. Table 5 shows these results.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 Finally, Table 6 shows the complete model predicting support for more direct 
involvement of the people with both consensus and homogeneity variables and national 
identity variables. Here, we see similar results (although, a small amount of variance is 
explained again; Adj. R2 = .058, F = 2.056, p = .001). National identity is a non-
significant predictor, which is contrary to my fifth hypothesis (H5), but it is in the 
negative direction (B = -.885, Std. Error = .594, t = -2.271, p = .137). Perceived 
consensus maintains its negative relationship with support for more involvement of the 
people, but it becomes only marginal (B = -.230, Std. Error = .126, t = -1.823, p = .069), 
which takes away partly from the support I found for H4, and generalized trust shows a 
significant negative relationship with support for more involvement (B = -.474, Std. Error 
= .132, t = -3.600, p < .001). We can also see that conservatism is significantly related to 
less support for more direct involvement (B = -.078, Std. Error = .034, t = -2.271, p = 
.024), those who are more likely to feel shame in the U.S. are more likely to support more 
direct involvement (B = -.107, Std. Error = .046, t = -2.308, p = .021),1 and age has a 
positive relationship with support for more direct involvement (B = .112, Std. Error = 
.055, t = 2.026, p = .043). Overall, these results suggest that perceptions of consensus and 
trust in others work to inhibit support for more direct involvement of the American 
people in decision-making, although this conclusion is only modestly supported.  
                                                 
1
 This variable was recoded so that higher values indicate less agreement with feeling ashamed of the U.S. 
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[Table 6 about here] 
Discussion 
 The results gathered from this study are in line with the hypothesized narrative. 
The finding that national identity is significantly positively related to perceptions of 
consensus and homogeneity stands consistently with previous research. Using the same 
data as Theiss-Morse (2009), I use a somewhat more complex model controlling for 
alternative types of national attachment (i.e., uncritical patriotism and nationalism) in 
order to duplicate and reinforce Theiss-Morse’s finding that high levels of national 
identity are significantly related to perceiving consensus and homogeneity among the 
American people with regard to their values and outlook as well as the degree to which 
American agree with one another on the major political issues. Beyond this finding, 
interpretation of these results requires careful consideration.  
The American People on Election Day versus the American People “Beyond” Election 
Day 
 A key point of interest in these findings is the divergence between the results 
regarding trust and confidence in the American people on Election Day and those 
regarding support for more direct involvement of the people. Both dependent variables 
can be said, in theory, to tap into support for political decision-making being in the hands 
of the people, or support for the democratic ideal. However, the two clearly are not 
affected the same way by the variables presented in my models. How can perceptions of 
consensus be positively related to putting faith in the American people on Election Day, 




   
As I have suggested in the beginning of this paper, the difference may lay in that 
having faith in the public on Election Day only requires that respondents trust the people 
within the current, representative system that has been “agreed-upon,” or is the “norm,” 
of the national group of the United States. On the other hand, support for more direct 
influence by the public is a deviation from that norm. Social identity has been shown to 
encourage people to adhere to prescribed group norms (e.g., Turner et al., 1987; Terry, 
Hogg, & White, 1999), and national identity has similar effects on political behavior 
(e.g., Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Accordingly, we would expect national identity to have a 
negative influence on support for more direct democracy, which is an extension beyond 
the norm. Further, elections can be though of as a forum for groups to elect fitting leaders 
who will lead the group. Indeed, there is much literature on the dynamics of group 
leadership that suggests that leaders are typically chosen that are prototypical of the 
group and represent that groups goals (e.g., Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 
2001; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). When people support direct democracy over 
the election of leaders, it is in some ways a resistance to the prescribed dynamics of the 
national group. However, we would then expect a negative relationship between national 
identity and support for more direct involvement of the public, and while the direction of 
the observed relationship is correct, it is evident that perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity, which are nonetheless influenced by national identity, play a somewhat 
larger role.  
Support for More Direct Involvement of the People as an Act of Distrust 
 In order to address the fact that H4 was supported to a greater extent than H5 (that 
is, there was a significant negative relationship between perceived consensus and support 
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for more direct democracy but only a non-significant relationship for national identity), it 
may be helpful to mix the current theory with another branch of literature. Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) suggest that there are two conceptions of representation: 
the mandate model and the accountability model. Under the mandate model, voters select 
a “program” by which political decisions will be made rather than a candidate. This 
requires 1) that campaigns keep their promises, and 2) that the winning platform actually 
be in line with the voters’ preferences. Also, it is essential that politicians and voters have 
similar interests, that politicians primarily seek re-election and believe that keeping their 
promises is the best way to achieve re-election, and that politicians want their future 
promises to be perceived as credible. Under the accountability model, the emphasis is on 
voters’ power over the government via the threat of backlash at re-election time. In 
essence, the mandate model of representation exists in a much more trusting, even 
credulous political world than the nearly cynical accountability model. 
 It makes sense then that people who identify more strongly with the American 
people, who perceive the people as being on the same page, and who are more trusting of 
others generally, to have a great deal of confidence in the American people on Election 
Day while also having more faith in the current political system in which the public will 
is filtered through politicians. In other words, people who are more trusting in general 
might be more okay with trusting in the mandate model of representation: “We elected 
these officials, and since I trust people in general, I trust that candidates will stay true to 
the promises they made in their campaigns. There is little need for a deviation from that.” 
Further, perceiving consensus in the American people makes it easier to perceive that 
politicians and voters have similar interests – the mandate model essentially becomes 
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“more realistic.” People who perceive the American public as a diverse body of issue 
stances would also be less likely to see politicians and voters as having similar interests – 
this makes the mandate model “less realistic.” As far as the implications of such an 
interpretation, it suggests that national identity and perceptions of consensus and 
homogeneity are associated with lower support with the deviation from the status quo 
that is more direct democracy, but more through consensus and homogeneity than the 
direct relationship with national identity referred to in H5, under which we would have 
observed a significant independent effect of national identity.    
Limitations and Conclusion 
 Although I have put forward a particular argument for how the two main 
dependent variables (trust and confidence in the public on Election Day and support for 
more direct involvement of the people) differ, further research is necessary to determine 
the extent to which this theory really encompasses the difference between the two items. 
As it stands, the difference between the two dependent variables can only be determined 
by face validity. Also, more broadly, it is difficult to make reliable interpretations of 
results based on single-item dependent variables. The results of this study would be much 
more powerful given a scale designed to tap into the constructs of interest. The 
interpretations of results put forward are simply the best the author has to offer given the 
available data.  
 Finally, the data for this study were collected in 2002 for a larger project. As such, 
the items included in the data were not designed specifically for this study, and some 
might argue that the data are outdated. However, I would argue that the purpose of the 
original data collection was close enough to the purposes of this study to mostly abate 
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concerns of the former, and while the relationships observed here may very well be in 
part an artifact of the times, this is no less true for any research study that does not utilize 
longitudinal data. Nonetheless, it is important to note that during the time of data 
collection, the United States was primarily under Republican control, and the tragedies of 
September 11th, 2001 were far from in the past, so the possibility of historical influence 
must not be ignored. It is possible, for example, that the effects of perceived consensus on 
support for democratic processes are different in data that were not collected during the 
“rally-around-the-flag” period following 9/11.   
Despite these limitations, the results presented in this paper suggest a relatively 
coherent story regarding the attachment Americans feel toward their fellow citizens, the 
subsequent perceptions of consensus and homogeneity that people see among the 
American people, and how much faith people put in democracy. Given the diverging 
results between the two main dependent variables, the story requires some nuance. When 
considering the decision-making abilities of the American people on Election Day, 
national identity and perceptions of consensus seem to exert a positive influence on 
people’s attitudes. However, when asked if the country would be better off with more 
direct democratic procedures, perceived consensus shows the opposite effect. Putting 
faith in the public’s wisdom on Election Day thus seems an act of trust, and of 
endorsement of the representative democratic system that is the “norm” of the United 
States. To support more direct involvement of the American people, however, is more an 
act of distrust, and an act of defiance against the agreed-upon system. From another 
perspective, people who are not trusting in general and perceive greater gaps in opinion 
among the public don’t trust politicians to fulfill their mandates, and don’t see the 
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necessary electoral connection between public official and constituent as realistic. Of 
course, one might think that this distrust can be applied to the public as well, but putting 
decision-making in the hands of the vague term, “the people,” is perhaps an acceptable 
alternative to keeping it in the hands of individuals who are already in charge of the 




   
APPENDIX A: Survey item wording 
American national identity items (7-point scale unless otherwise noted; transformed to 
range from 0-1): 
1. Do you identify with the American people?  
2. I am a person who feels strong ties to the American people. (5-point scale) 
3. Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person. (5-point 
scale) 
4. Where would you place the American people about being informed about 
politics? 
5. Where would you place the American people about being unselfish? 
6. Where would you place the American people about being tolerant? 
Nationalism items (5-point scale):  
1. Generally the U.S. is a better country than most other countries. 
2. I cannot think of another country in which I would rather live. 
3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like 
the people in the U.S. 




   
APPENDIX B: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: OLS regression predicting trust and confidence in the American people on 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.445 .324   4.461 <.001 
Personal similarity  .055 .030 .079 1.847 .065 
Personal agreement  .110 .039 .132 2.841 .005 
Perceived homogeneity .051 .033 .070 1.567 .118 
Perceived consensus .280 .081 .149 3.458 .001 
Pers sim*Perc homog -.055 .025 -.093 -2.189 .029 
Pers sim*Perc consensus .005 .071 .003 .072 .943 
Pers agree*Perceived homog .029 .032 .040 .900 .368 
Pers agree*Perceived 
consensus 
.052 .075 .030 .694 .488 
Ideology -.004 .022 -.009 -.198 .843 
Political knowledge  .076 .145 .023 .522 .602 
Gender  -.095 .066 -.060 -1.435 .152 
Income -.008 .027 -.014 -.315 .753 
Age .039 .034 .049 1.156 .248 
White -.137 .165 -.055 -.829 .407 
Black -.131 .199 -.041 -.655 .513 
Hispanic -.069 .165 -.019 -.417 .677 
Native .078 .159 .020 .488 .626 
Christian .017 .083 .009 .203 .839 
 
Education -.005 .020 -.012 -.265 .791 
 
F 3.331 <.001    
 
Adj. R2 .071     
 
N 581     
a. Dependent Variable: “How much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American 
people when it comes to making choices on Election Day?” 
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Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .159 .147   1.087 .278 
Group identity -.006 .019 -.015 -.290 .772 
National identity .776 .207 .222 3.752 <.001 
Ideology -.005 .013 -.019 -.403 .687 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Support when wrong 
.000 .017 .001 .026 .979 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Ashamed (reverse-coded) 
.012 .017 .032 .697 .486 
Nationalism -.006 .032 -.009 -.170 .865 
Generalized trust .147 .047 .144 3.120 .002 
Political knowledge .064 .083 .036 .767 .444 
Gender .054 .038 .064 1.421 .156 
Income -.031 .016 -.096 -1.984 .048 
Age .007 .020 .015 .330 .741 
White -.056 .093 -.042 -.605 .546 
Black .123 .114 .071 1.087 .277 
 
Hispanic .018 .093 .009 .196 .845 
 
Native -.151 .093 -.072 -1.630 .104 
 
Christian .001 .048 .001 .023 .982 
 
Education -.009 .012 -.038 -.761 .447 
 
F 3.183 <.001    
 
Adj. R2 .066     
 
N 523     
a. Dependent Variable: “On the major issues of the day, do Americans agree almost all the time, 
agree sometimes, disagree sometimes, or disagree almost all the time?” 
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Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.137 .351   -.389 .698 
Group identity .072 .046 .074 1.559 .120 
National identity 1.859 .494 .210 3.764 <.001 
Ideology .005 .030 .008 .179 .858 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Support when wrong 
.141 .041 .155 3.437 .001 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Ashamed (reverse-coded) 
.072 .041 .078 1.782 .075 
Nationalism .048 .078 .031 .611 .541 
Generalized trust .311 .113 .120 2.755 .006 
Political knowledge .196 .199 .043 .982 .327 
Gender .082 .091 .038 .900 .368 
Income .015 .037 .019 .409 .682 
Age .066 .048 .061 1.393 .164 
White -.196 .222 -.058 -.882 .378 
Black .219 .271 .050 .809 .419 
 
Hispanic -.212 .222 -.043 -.959 .338 
 
Native -.123 .222 -.023 -.554 .580 
 
Christian -.049 .116 -.018 -.421 .674 
 
Education -.033 .029 -.055 -1.169 .243 
 
F 7.265 <.001    
 
Adj. R2 .170     
 
N 522     
a. Dependent Variable: “Americans are similar to each other, sharing the same values and outlooks.” 
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Table 4: OLS regression predicting trust and confidence in the American people on 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.837 .264   10.741 <.001 
Group identity -.032 .035 -.045 -.928 .354 
National identity 1.866 .390 .289 4.784 <.001 
Ideology -.012 .023 -.024 -.535 .593 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Support when wrong 
-.040 .031 -.060 -1.274 .203 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Ashamed (reverse-coded) 
.051 .030 .074 1.662 .097 
Nationalism -.060 .059 -.053 -1.016 .310 
Personal similarity .048 .031 .070 1.536 .125 
Personal agreement .056 .041 .068 1.362 .174 
Perceived homogeneity .039 .034 .053 1.127 .260 
Perceived consensus .203 .083 .110 2.461 .014 
Pers sim*Perc homog -.027 .026 -.046 -1.065 .288 
Pers sim*Perc consensus .054 .071 .034 .757 .450 
Pers agree*Perc homog .055 .032 .079 1.723 .086 
 
Pers agree*Perc consensus .077 .074 .045 1.044 .297 
 
Generalized trust .222 .086 .117 2.567 .011 
 Political knowledge .081 .149 .024 .542 .588 
 Gender -.074 .068 -.047 -1.088 .277 
 
Income -.029 .028 -.049 -1.036 .301 
 
Age -.020 .036 -.025 -.564 .573 
 
White -.167 .167 -.068 -1.003 .316 
 
Black -.107 .203 -.033 -.526 .599 
 
Hispanic -.145 .166 -.040 -.875 .382 
 
Native .147 .166 .038 .888 .375 
 
Christian -.080 .087 -.041 -.922 .357 
 
Education -.003 .021 -.007 -.141 .888 
 
F 4.311 <.001    
 
Adj. R2 .137     
 
N 521     
a. Dependent Variable: “How much trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the American 
people when it comes to making choices on Election Day?” 
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Table 5: OLS regression predicting support for more direct involvement of the American 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 3.418 .485   7.048 <.001 
Personal similarity  -.037 .044 -.037 -.840 .401 
Personal agreement  .057 .057 .047 .986 .325 
Perceived homogeneity .064 .048 .061 1.327 .185 
Perceived consensus -.336 .120 -.124 -2.807 .005 
Pers sim*Perc homog .059 .037 .070 1.593 .112 
Pers sim*Perc consensus -.117 .104 -.050 -1.120 .263 
Pers agree*Perceived homog -.010 .047 -.010 -.217 .829 
Pers agree*Perceived 
consensus 
.054 .111 .021 .485 .628 
Ideology -.056 .032 -.079 -1.753 .080 
Political knowledge  -.107 .216 -.022 -.493 .622 
Gender  -.051 .098 -.023 -.523 .601 
Income -.062 .039 -.073 -1.566 .118 
Age .044 .050 .038 .877 .381 
White -.289 .249 -.081 -1.161 .246 
Black -.032 .298 -.007 -.109 .913 
Hispanic .333 .244 .064 1.364 .173 
Native .350 .239 .063 1.461 .144 
Christian -.059 .123 -.021 -.482 .630 
 
Education -.034 .030 -.054 -1.141 .254 
 
F 1.828 .017    
 
Adj. R2 .027     
 
N 577     
a. Dependent Variable: “If the American people decided political issues directly instead of relying on 
politicians, the country would be a lot better off.” 
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Table 6: OLS regression predicting support for more direct involvement of the American 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 3.092 .407   7.590 <.001 
Group identity .006 .053 .006 .122 .903 
National identity -.885 .594 -.094 -1.490 .137 
Ideology -.078 .034 -.109 -2.271 .024 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Support when wrong 
.012 .047 .012 .252 .801 
Uncritical Patriotism: 
Ashamed (reverse-coded) 
-.107 .046 -.108 -2.308 .021 
Nationalism .064 .090 .039 .708 .479 
Personal similarity .000 .048 .000 -.009 .992 
Personal agreement .098 .062 .082 1.565 .118 
Perceived homogeneity .074 .052 .070 1.404 .161 
Perceived consensus -.230 .126 -.085 -1.823 .069 
Pers sim*Perc homog .020 .039 .023 .507 .612 
Pers sim*Perc consensus -.127 .108 -.055 -1.177 .240 
Pers agree*Perc homog -.043 .049 -.042 -.875 .382 
 
Pers agree*Perc consensus .102 .112 .042 .911 .363 
 
Generalized trust -.474 .132 -.172 -3.600 <.001 
 
Political knowledge -.054 .228 -.011 -.236 .813 
 Gender -.010 .104 -.004 -.098 .922 
 Income -.059 .043 -.068 -1.374 .170 
 
Age .112 .055 .096 2.026 .043 
 
White -.178 .259 -.049 -.687 .492 
 
Black -.101 .313 -.022 -.321 .748 
 
Hispanic .402 .253 .076 1.588 .113 
 
Native .229 .259 .040 .885 .376 
 
Christian -.069 .132 -.024 -.518 .604 
 
Education -.017 .033 -.026 -.508 .612 
 
F 2.298 <.001    
 
Adj. R2 .059     
 
N 517     
a. Dependent Variable: “If the American people decided political issues directly instead of relying on 
politicians, the country would be a lot better off.” 
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Figure 1: Interaction of personal similarity and perceived homogeneity predicting trust 
and confidence in the American people on Election Day 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction of personal agreement and perceived homogeneity predicting trust 
and confidence in the American people on Election Day 
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